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ABSTRACT
Few companies globally source and manage commercial transportation for frequent and high
volumes of explosive cargo for the U. S. Department of Defense. U.S. regulations are strict and
economically competitive options are limited. The challenge is even more problematic when the
company has not developed an internal capability to efficiently manage logistics transportation.
Companies view logistics and supply chain management as crucial to their overall success, though
most do not claim it as a core competency. Instead, companies often outsource logistics operations
and management to 3"r Party Logistics and other transportation solution providers.
This paper explores how a company dealing with frequent shipments of explosive, Department of
Defense cargo need not fully outsource logistics operations and management. Rather this paper
shows how a company can quickly and cost-effectively improve their internal logistics capability
while utilizing the benefits of logistics outsourcing. It is imperative that a company evolving its
logistics capability maintain flexibility yet realize the advances in the transportation outsourcing
industry.
This research is distinctive in that it provides a case study of an organization that utilizes global
partners supplying the U.S. Government in substantial volumes and must operate within the
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1 Introduction
1.1 Company Background
Principle Defense Supply (PDS), for over 30 years, has been a leader in the production of
armaments and program management for the U.S. Government (USG). The company has revenues
of half a billion dollars and employs around 300 people. PDS is a business division within a large
multi-billion dollar conglomerate company called Armament Solutions (AS).
All company names have been disguised in this paper.
1.2 Problem Statement
Recent program contracts awarded to PDS by the Department of Defense (DoD) have grown in
logistics and supply chain complexity. Early programs had only required staffing a small logistics
team, as the logistics network had few transactions and was confined to the continental United
States. The newer, high-volume programs have necessitated creating an international network of
suppliers to meet demand volumes. More than half of the finished goods assembly occurs
internationally. Some of these programs require monthly deliveries of millions of units of explosive
cargo to U.S. military depots.
Raw materials are still procured from domestic U.S. suppliers but are then transported by air or
ocean to global suppliers for final transformation. Figure 1 shows the transportation of goods from
the raw material providers to the finished good assemblers and then the transportation of finished
goods back to USG depots. The USG expects PDS to manage and oversee all to/from cargo
transportation, using commercial vessels, when international shipping is required.
9 Raw Material Location Finished Good Assembler N Government Depots
Figure 1: Sample Logistics Network
Adding to the complexity of PDS managing monthly transportation are:
1. An existing contractual agreement with a logistics transportation broker who lacks breadth
and resources to support the complexity of high volume international shipping
2. A U.S. legal requirement to ship finished product on U.S.-Flag vessels
3. Non-availability of liner service meeting the necessary legal requirements in international
locations either due to non-service or certain ports-of-call not accepting explosive class 1
cargo
4. Hesitancy or rejection by certain ocean liner carriers to transport class 1 cargo
PDS's primary transportation mode previously had been domestic trucking but had transitioned to
international ocean shipping as shown in Figures 2 and 3. PDS's small logistics team (PDS-L), with
experience supporting a simple transportation network of domestic trucking shipments, was
overwhelmed with the complexity of managing a global network. The manpower, tools and
capability of the logistics team were underestimated in supporting the more complex programs.
Pressure grew on the team to execute high volume, international transactions as well as support new
bids without an infusion of people and resources:
Figure 2: PDS 2007 Transportation Spending By Mode Figure 3: PDS 2007 Transportation Spending By Region
PDS-L entered into a promising new partnership with a freight forwarder, yet this partner was not
able to provide complete solutions. PDS-L continued to do much of the work of arranging
transportation, completing import/export documents, auditing invoices, providing customer status
updates, and consequently fell behind in meeting internal expectations. The PDS-L team struggled
with finding reliable solutions for economically feasible shipments to and from the international
suppliers. As much of the PDS cargo was explosive in nature, shippers would often prioritize easier-
to-handle cargo over PDS's.
PDS-L performed to the best of their abilities to manage all of the shipments workload, but major
opportunities became apparent:
1. Need to re-establish matrix structure. PDS was governed by a matrix organizational
structure. The PDS-L team was tasked with supporting logistics for all PDS programs but
had become unable to provide attention and transportation expertise to less critical PDS
programs. These ignored programs went outside of the PDS-L team and handled their own
transportation decisions with less experienced personnel and without a holistic view of the
entire PDS organization. Many of these transportation decisions weren't efficient and cost
effective for PDS.
2. Need for metrics to better understand operational execution, improvement opportunities
and drive accountability. PDS-L captured forecasted shipment costs vs. actual costs, but no
other transportation and visibility metrics were captured.
3. Tools and resources for driving metrics. PDS had very crude and antiquated systems for
automatically capturing data, making data capture very difficult.
4. Process thinking and benchmarking. The team had not thought about processes to simplify
their work nor had they reached out to teams and organizations externally for best practices
that could have improved execution.
PDS had never made logistics a priority, but the performance and execution of the support function
had become highly visible as it had major implications on the financial and operational performance
of multiple programs. One program in particular had exposed the opportunities in logistics
management. The program had exceeded budget by more than 50% and delivery schedules had
been renegotiated numerous times to compensate for previously missed schedules. Several months
of finished goods were awaiting pickup at the finished goods supplier, prompting receivables and
security concerns. In response, other PDS programs had taken logistics into their own hands and
missed transportation cost savings opportunities of 20%. Obvious process improvements were
missed. PDS executives were frustrated with the responsiveness of the team. Action had to be
taken to improve the PDS-L team's performance for current programs and future programs.
1.3 Problem Approach
Addressing the problem is broken into two distinct tasks:
1. Strategies to assist with complexities in shipping high volumes of explosive cargo subject to
U.S.-Flag vessel constraints
2. Strategies to improve the daily execution of the PDS logistics team
1.4 Key Ideas/Hypothesis
Based on the challenges facing the organization and the fact that PDS does not desire to be a
logistics provider, PDS should outsource the entire logistics operation to an experienced 3PL which
can manage the challenges more efficiently.
1.5 Statement of Thesis Contributions
This research is distinctive in that it provides a case study of an organization that utilizes global
partners supplying the U.S. Government in substantial volumes and still must operate within the
confines of hazardous goods regulations and archaic United States Department of Defense shipping
regulations.
1.6 Thesis Overview
This document provides a short literature review detailing DoD commercial ocean shipping and
regulations, more details on the research, analysis and observations conducted onsite, and
conclusions and recommendations based on the research and observations.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Ocean Shipping Industry
This section details the ocean shipping industry, organizations that govern the industry and some
events that have shaped PDS's challenges.
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, containership ocean shipping accounts for 80% of the shipping mode
by the PDS-L team. Cargo is typically priced by and shipped in 20 or 40 ton equivalent unit (TEU)
containers. Containers have to be ammo grade certified' by the U.S. Coast Guard. Many times
PDS-L was responsible for arranging labor for packing containers, adding to the per TEU costs.
Similar to air travel, liner and charter service exists for containerships. Liner service makes regular
scheduled voyages on a set route trading on a timetable. Some of the largest containership liner
operators include Maersk, Evergreen, COSCO, Hapaq-Lloyd and APL2. Liner service benefits from
economies of scale and frequently is less expensive than charter service based on economies of scale.
Charter service tends to be operated by smaller enterprises and used for unique cargo, infrequent
service and service between less trafficked ports-of-call. Most of the time charters are the option of
last resort for transporting hazardous cargo; this was the case with PDS.
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) is the agency within the U.S. Department of
Transportation dealing with waterborne transportation. The agency works in many areas involving
ships and shipping, shipbuilding, port operations, vessel operations, national security, environment,
and safety and is also charged with maintaining the health of the merchant marine. MARAD also
maintains a fleet of cargo ships in reserve to provide surge sealift during war and national
1 Per DoD Handbook document MIL-HDBK-138B
2 (Burnson, Ocean Carriers: 50 players to watch, 2008)
emergencies and recently realigned many of its functions to revitalize its role as an industry
facilitator3 . PDS-L maintains regular communication with MARAD on the availability of U.S.-Flag
vessels.
2.2 Department of Defense and Explosives Cargo Transportation
This section details the organizations and standards governing the transportation of Department of
Defense and explosives cargo.
The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) through the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) is the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the strategic distribution
system and oversees all DoD shipments through the world. MSC provides sealift with a fleet of
government-owned and chartered U.S.-flagged ships, executed through the VISA program4 , which is
described in section 2.3. PDS-L personnel inferred that USTRANSCOM vessels were restricted to
U.S. military business and not to be used by commercial entities (such as PDS), regardless of the
cargos end use or destination.
The Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC) acts as a liaison between government
shippers and commercial carriers. SDDC is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of
contracts, solicitations and agreements with the carrier industry to deploy and distribute Department
of Defense supplies, personal property and personnel worldwide. Additionally, SDDC maintains
contracts with information technology firms to assist in the development of software applications to
manage transportation movements s. Trucking companies that want to move DoD cargo have to be
certified by SDDC and conform to regulations such as tag team drivers and satellite tracking. PDS
3 (Maritime Administration)
4 (United States Transportation Command, 2007)
5 (United States Transportation Command, 2007)
did not deal directly with SDDC, but they had to ensure that cargo transported conformed to their
guidelines.
Class 1, which denotes any explosive cargo, is divided into hazard divisions and compatibility
groups. The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) is the Federal safety authority for
ensuring the safe transport of hazardous materials (hazmat) by air, rail, highway, and water, with the
exception of bulk transportation of hazmat by vessel. OHMS also works with other DOT operating
administrations to help them administer hazmat safety programs effectively6 .
Some of OHMS responsibilities include:
* Evaluating safety risks
* Developing and enforcing standards for transporting hazardous materials
* Educating shippers and carriers
* Investigating hazmat incidents and failures
* Conducting research
OHMS, in conjunction with the IATA7, United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods and other standards bodies, developed guidelines and rules for how shippers
handle class 1 cargo. PDS's cargo tends to fall within the C, D & S compatibility groups of Exhibit
1, located in the Appendix. Exhibits 2 and 3, also located in the Appendix, highlight the
complexities in loading class 1 cargo on vessels and how it is important to keep different
compatibility groups separated from each other. The complexities and risks in carrying class 1 cargo
drove some ocean carriers to refuse all such cargo, further reducing PDS-L's capacity and reliability
in meeting schedules.
6 (The Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration Office of Hazardous Materials Safety)
7 International Air Transportation Association
2.3 U.S. Cargo Act and U.S.-Flag Regulations
This section details the USG regulations that PDS is governed by relating to shipping Department
of Defense cargo.
The Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904, as revised and implemented into Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplements (DFARS), requires that 100% of items procured for or owned
by U.S. military departments and defense agencies be carried exclusively on U.S.-Flag vessels unless
one of the following occurs:
1. No vessel is available (Reasonable Availability)
2. The proposed charges are higher than charges to private persons for the transportation of
like goods (Reasonable Cost)
3. The proposed freight charges are excessive or unreasonable, as determined by the Secretary
of the Navy or Army who has been delegated such authority by the President of the United
States.
A waiver process exists for an entity to petition to move cargo on non U.S.-Flag vessels. The U.S.
Government must be given 45 days to approve or deny the waiver according to the DFARS
252.247-7023.8
A U.S.-Flag vessel is owned and crewed by American citizens and subject to higher regulatory,
safety, tax, and labor requirements than their global competitors.' On average U.S.-Flag vessels are
38% more expensive to operateo, therefore the demand shifted from U.S.-Flag vessels to non U.S.-
8 Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation located at http://farsite.hill.af.mil/VFDFARA.HTM
9 (Harrelson, 2008)
10 Reeve & Associates report p. 18
Flag vessels. U.S.-Flag vessels now only encompass 2% of the overall world oceangoing
containership fleet".
During the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, the U.S. Military was forced to contract a high
percentage of non U.S.-Flag vessels to maintain supplies to the effort. In response to this event and
to preserve a U.S.-Flag fleet and enable flexibility to the USG, a program was created in 1996 and
renewed in 2003 called the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) to build up a ready reserve of U.S.-Flag capacity. The MSP program subsidizes
40 of 75 useful U.S.-Flag containerships 12.
The MSP/VISA program subsidizes commercial cargo ocean carriers through an annual payment of
$2.9 million per vehicle"3 . In return, the U.S. Military has priority access to the commercial U.S.-Flag
vessels and associated intermodal network. The benefits of the MSP program to the U.S.
Government are tremendous. It is estimated that the USG maintaining their own fleet would cost
around $1.7 billion annually. The same study estimates that $140.4 million was paid in subsidies, a
tremendous value proposition to the USG 4.
The study also highlights how the subsidy is hardly enough to support the additional costs of
supporting a U.S.-Flag vessel for ocean carriers. The MSP subsidy may cover half of the additional
38% cost differential so carriers are dependent on volume to offset their higher costs. Figure 4
displays how carriers have benefited from increased volumes due to the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan to offset the cost differentials. Future trends in U.S.-Flag volumes will impact the
USG's willingness to allow non U.S.-Flag waivers.
" Cited from MARAD 2006 Top 25 Flag of Registry report
12 40 containerships cited from Reeve & Associates report p. 11. 75 containership cited from MARAD U.S.-Flag 2007 fleet report
13 Payments of $2.9 million 2009-2011 & $3.1 million 2012-2015 from 70 Fed. Reg. 55582 (2005) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 296)
14 Reeve & Associates report p. 5
Exhibit di~"
U.S.-Flag Commercial Vessel Carriage of
Military Preference Dry Cargo Shipments
in Fiscal Years 1995-2005
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Figure 4: U.S.-Flag Volumes of Military Cargo
2.4 Freight Forwarders and Brokers
This section explains the important roles freight forwarders and brokers serve in international ocean
shipping.
Like most global shippers, PDS relies heavily on freight forwarders and brokers to facilitate cost-
efficient cargo transportation and navigate complex import/export rules. The USG provides
guidance that PDS has to be the intermediary between freight forwarders and brokers, rather than
letting PDS's raw material and finished good suppliers work directly with freight forwarders and
brokers.
A freight forwarder is an agent that supports moving cargo to international locations. They advise
on prices of carriers, assist in import/export documentation preparation and administration. Export
freight forwarders are licensed by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to handle air
freight and the Federal Maritime Commission to handle ocean freight.15
A customs broker performs customs transactions at ports on behalf of other parties. Brokers are
hired either directly by the importing/exporting party or by a freight forwarder. They are
15s (Export.gov)
knowledgeable in the intricacies of import/export compliance and can also advise on prices for
transportation. 16
2.5 3PL Outsourcing
This section describes the role a 3PL serves in the transportation industry and current trends in 3PL
outsourcing. As the hypothesis tests whether or not it is feasible for PDS to outsource their logistics
tasks to a 3PL, it is valuable to understand the 3PL market. The research conducted at PDS
included understanding their business and capability and where a 3PL might fit in.
A 3rd Party Logistics Provider (3PL) provides third party and/or outsourced transportation and
warehousing services for a shipper. Many companies outsource their entire supply chain
management functions to these companies who then develop custom solutions for the shipper.
The term 4PL has been used to describe an enhancement to the 3PL relationship where the third
party company will provide onsite human capital and information technology services in addition to
the integrated transportation services. There is some dissent in the difference between 3PLs and
4PLs within the transportation industry. For the purpose of this paper, 3PL will be used to describe
a 3rd party transportation services provider.
The 2008 State of Logistics Outsourcing'7 study conducted by Georgia Tech and CapGemini
provides informative analysis on why companies outsource their logistics operations. Of the 1,644
global logistics and supply chain executives surveyed and interviewed, 87% agreed that logistics
exemplifies a strategic advantage for their companies. The study also elaborated on what factors
make outsourcing successful. These include:
16 (Export America, 2003)
17 The study can be found at http://3plstudy.com/
1. Strong relationships - Awareness and relationships from the executive level all the way down
to operations are critical for maintaining efficient operations and cost savings opportunities.
2. Strong contracts - A strong up-front contract was critical to regulating business, but
ensuring that both parties communicated and didn't rely solely on language in the contract
was also important.
3. Metrics - Being able to measure results when working with a 3PL is critical in understanding
the value they have brought to the relationship.
3PLs' strength is providing diverse solutions based on their strong and established relationships with
many different transportation providers. One potential 3PL partner displayed this strength when
shipping weapons for PDS-L. PDS had spent over a month contacting transportation providers,
including a well known airline that could potentially move the weapons to Europe. PDS ultimately
found no responsive suppliers. Subsequently, an inquiry was made to a 3PL. Less than one day
after making a call for help to the potential 3PL partner, the weapons were booked for shipment on
the same airline that had previously declined PDS-L. This example underscores the strength in
relationships among logistics providers and the value of solutions they provide to shippers.
Approximately 80% of Fortune 500 companies outsource some or all of their transportation to
3PLs18 . Figure 5 highlights the variety of services outsourced:
18 (Elliff, 2004)
Domestic Transportation 85% 81%
International Transportation 81 69
Warehousing 72 70
Customs clearance & brokerage 65 66
Forwarding 52 48
Shipment consolidation 46 46
Reverse logistics (defective, repair, return) 38 31
Cross-docking 38 37
Transportation management 37 39
(shipment planning and execution with one or more carriers)
Product labeling, packaging, assembly, kitting 36 29
Freight bill auditing and payment 30 54
Supply chain consultancy provided by 3PLs 17 21
Order entry, processing and fulfillment 15 12
Fleet management 13 9
LLP/4PL services 13 11
Customer service 12 11
Figure 5: Logistics Services Outsourced 19
The ability to integrate information technology quickly without internal investment costs and
resources is another key reason that a company would partner with a 3PL. A company is able to
acquire technological capabilities that it would not be able to obtain on its own20 . 3PLs offer a
variety of I/T integrated services as highlighted by the percentages in Figure 6:
19 From p 13, Figure 6 of (C. John Langley, Jr., Ph.D., and Capgemini U.S. LLC., 2008)
20 (Lynch, 2002)
Warehouse/distribution center management 66
Web enabled communications 65
Transportation management (execution) 63
Visibility tools (tracking/tracing, etc.) 58
Barcode generation and scanning 50
Transportation management (planning) 44
Customer order management 31
Collaboration tools (inventory levels, production schedules) 26
Supplier relationship management 26
Yard management 24
Supply Chain Planning 22
Internet based transportation-logistics exchanges 21
Customer relationship management 21
Global trade management 20
RFID (asset tracking) 13
Figure 6: IT-Based Services Provided by 3PLs21
Efficiently outsourcing logistics is not a trivial task. Understanding the current state through
performance measurements and by developing a clear objective is a prerequisite before approaching
a 3PL. Talented employees that can maintain a progressive relationship as well as drive the
integration are critical factors for success22 . When evaluating whether or not to outsource, these
factors should be considered 23:
1. Lack of management commitment
2. Lack of outsourcing communications plan
3. Minimal knowledge of outsourcing methodologies
4. Failure to recognize outsourcing business risks
5. Failure to obtain outside outsourcing professionals
6. Not dedicating the best and brightest internal resources
7. Rushing through the initiative
21 From p. 14, Figure 7 of (C. John Langley, Jr., Ph.D., and Capgemini U.S. LLC., 2008)
22 (Elliff, 2004)
23 (Power, Bonifazi, & Desouza, 2004)
8. Not recognizing the impact of cultural differences
9. Minimizing what it will take to make the vendor productive
10. No formal outsourcing governance program
Firms should also avoid becoming overly dependent on their 3PL partners. Many companies have
become locked in to their 3PL partner and a significant amount of work and cost is required to
rebuild what has been outsourced. Some suggestions for avoiding this trap included24:
1. Ongoing measurement of 3PL performance and meaningful dialogue
2. Possibility of working with multiple 3PL's
3. Judicious use of rebidding 3PL business as business needs evolve
4. Retaining internal expertise
24 (C. John Langley, Jr., Ph.D., and Capgemini U.S. LLC., 2008)
3 Research Analysis
3.1 Summary of Approach
As the problems witnessed at PDS were organizational in nature, the approach taken to understand
and identify current state and future opportunities was the following:
1. Organization analysis
2. Value Stream mapping
3. Metrics definition
4. Partner with customer for process improvement
5. Benchmark
6. Identify 3PL and other transportation partners
This approach ultimately yielded other actions and activities, some of which are highlighted in the
conclusion.
3.2 Organization Analysis
A three lenses analysis was conducted to understand the strategic, cultural and political interactions
of PDS. Reflecting on each lens helps to balance an individual's bias in order to better understand
the functions of organizations, the means of organizing, and information necessary to make sense of
an organization.25
3.2.1 Strategic Lens
The strategic lens attempts to describe how the organization has been designed to achieve goals by
carrying out tasks. PDS utilizes a matrix organizational design. As illustrated in the Figure 7 below,
25 (Carroll, 2006)
each program is led by a vice president or director responsible for the profit and loss of the
program.
Figure 7: PDS Matrix Organizational Design
Each program VP or director reports to the General Manager of PDS. Functional organizations are
represented by horizontal arrows, led by a Senior Manager or Director, and responsible for
performance management, issue escalation and driving consistency within the function. Each
functional director also reports to the General Manager of the division. Program leads are
dependent on the success of their program through the initiative and work of support organizations.
It is imperative that program leads stay in constant communication with functional directors and
leads.
During the course of the research, the Director of Supply Chain and Logistics left the company and
the position was not backfilled. The PDS-L senior manager was reassigned to another functional
Director, who was inexperienced with logistics. This is relevant as it continued the lack of strong
leadership needed for logistics across PDS, and it increased the importance of the recommendations
conducted through this research.
3.2.2 Cultural Lens
PDS is a business unit within a larger conglomerate company. PDS was acquired less than ten years
ago and most of the existing leadership team from the acquisition was left in place and remains to
this day. PDS is very proud of their history and isolates itself from the rest of the business divisions
and units within Armament Solutions. Very few people have transferred to PDS from other
business divisions and units and even fewer have transferred out.
The PDS workforce is comprised of many "lifers," employees that have been with the company for
over 25 years. An attitude sensed in some of the leadership is "The old way has always worked, so
why change now?" Therefore, there is not enough emphasis on developing people and investing in
technology to retain the institutional knowledge of the division.
PDS captures and posts few operational measures, making it difficult to drive accountability. At the
executive level, financial measures are tracked, but at the lower program levels, few metrics are
posted and employees have no infrastructure to pull any metrics together. Everything is tracked on
individuals' Excel spreadsheets and frequently employees will be tracking the exact same metrics on
their own files. Many employees within PDS are tactically focused, simply "fighting the fires" of the
day and rarely stopping to think about how to improve the process and drive to root cause.
3.2.3 Political Lens
The environment at PDS is collaborative. Everyone is friendly, helpful, and interested in helping
new players on the team. There is a strong sense of commitment to the team and programs that
individuals are working on. PDS is small enough that most everyone knows each other and knows
who the right person is to address questions.
The U.S. Government is the primary customer for PDS and the affability in the relationship
between the USG and PDS varies by program. On most programs, there are years of history that
have forged strong bonds. The program that had exposed PDS's lack of logistics management has a
significant amount of tension between parties. There is a sense of distrust built by complexities in
the program, delayed schedules and negotiations over equitable consideration.
3.2.4 Organization Structure
The PDS-L team, as illustrated in Figure 8, was led by a Senior Manager whose attention was spread
between logistics, inventory control and master scheduling functions. The Logistics Operations
Manager also had direct reports in non-logistics functions. The Logistics Operations Lead was the
one employee solely dedicated to supporting Logistics for all programs.
Figure 8: PDS-L Organization Chart
3.2.5 SWOT Analysis
A SWOT analysis was conducted by the author to identify the underlying factors affecting the PDS-
L team. The objective was to improve the daily and long term support of logistics initiatives within
the PDS organization.
3.2.5.1 Strengths - traits of the organization that are helpful to achieving the objective.
The team has tremendous explosives shipping knowledge and understanding of the constraints
with shipping class 1 cargo globally. One member of the team had obtained explosives
shipping knowledge through 20 years in the armed forces, but much of the team's knowledge
had been acquired through trial-and-error. In a niche industry such as explosives shipping,
understanding the U.S. and international customs regulations is extremely important.
3.2.5.2 Weaknesses - traits of the organization that are harmful to achieving the objective.
The main weaknesses of PDS-L are a lack of standard processes, absenteeism, and a resistance
to trying new methods to continually improve. The team has few standardized processes and
needs process thinking to simplify their tasks. For instance, there was an ineffective process of
having all inbound communication route to one person on the team. When this employee was
absent, no work occurred. Instead of the team developing a solution, a consultant drove
implementation of a simple, generic e-mail inbox that was visible to all of the PDS-L team,
creating a more reliable and customer efficient process. PDS-L lacks support when team
members are absent. Absences of team members put a strain on the workload of other team
members. During the six month time frame of this study, it is estimated that one team member
was absent at least 35% of the time, including one day where all team members were absent.
Redundancy and daily support are critical in logistics operations. With the exception of one
new partnership, the team infrequently reached out to new companies in the logistics industry
and usually relied on its long-time partnerships. Multiple times it was expressed by the team
that only a few players could ship or deal with explosives and it was not worth the investment
in evaluating new sourcing opportunities. New ideas and approaches to problems are easily
and quickly dismissed.
3.2.5.3 Opportunities - external conditions that are helpful to achieving the objective.
The proliferation and breadth of 3PLs is an important trend in the transportation industry. An
outside partner can provide immediate information technology infrastructure as well as cost
savings opportunities. 3PLs provide standardized processes that can help alleviate the team's
requests for iterative quote solicitations for domestic and international transportation. All PDS
programs have a need for transportation information to be used in bids, estimations and actual
transportation. 3PLs can also perform in a more cost effective manner administrative tasks that
were overwhelming the Logistics team, such as pro-forma invoices, import/export compliance
documentation, etc.
3.2.5.4 Threats - external conditions which could do damage to the business's performance.
No outside threats exist to PDS-L. The threat is in the team's ability to execute. Leadership
lacks a vision for how to communicate and improve performance. Internal customers desire
and need more proactive information from the team.
3.3 Value Stream Mapping
Value stream maps are used in lean manufacturing methods to document all the value and non-value
added actions required to bring an item through the main flows of transformation. Value stream
maps are useful for evaluating the big picture and not for optimizing one particular operation.
Especially critical is that value stream maps document the physical flow as well as information flows
within a process. 26
Value stream maps are traditionally used in factory environments to better understand the factory
floor flows and implications on inventory. For this research, value stream maps were developed for
the most complex PDS programs' regular tasks of shipping components to finished good suppliers
and returning finished product back to the U.S. Exhibit 4, located in the Appendix, illustrates the
process required for PDS-L to facilitate moving raw materials from their domestic U.S. suppliers to
their international finished goods suppliers. Exhibit 5 illustrates the process for PDS-L to facilitate
transporting finished goods back to U.S. Military depots. Exhibit 6 documents some of the pre-
defined processes in Exhibits 4 & 5.
The strength of performing a value stream map on the logistics process was that it highlighted the
excessive electronic communication required to facilitate each shipment of raw materials and
finished goods. The zigzag lines between boxes represent the electronic communications between
26 (Rother & Shook, 2003)
PDS-L, their transportation providers, brokers, suppliers and customers. The PDS-L team was the
central point of all communications in cargo transactions and was consumed by constantly tracking
shipments. Daily, they had to contact the different parties involved in each shipment to understand
the status and issues. They were also responsible for completing time consuming administrative
documentation that could be completed by a knowledgeable partner or party.
An efficient future state for the processes includes removing the constant back-and-forth
communications and time-consuming customs paperwork. Transportation statuses and information
needs to be pushed or available to PDS-L rather than the team having to constantly contact parties
to monitor the latest status. Logistics improvement efforts have to include adopting informative
transportation I/T resources and tools as well as identifying headcount or processes that could free
the team from administrative tasks so that they could focus on more strategic tasks.
3.4 Metrics Definition
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something
about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and
unsatisfactoy kind."
Lord Kelvin27
The PDS-L team does not possess information technology resources that can facilitate metrics
collection for identifying performance improvement opportunities. PDS-L only compiles high level
financial metrics such as overall transportation spending. With the exception of the recently
adopted transportation partner, past partners had no capability for supply chain visibility or the
ability to electronically capture information which could be used at a later date to make decisions.
27 [PLA, vol. 1, "Electrical Units of Measurement", 1883-05-03]
Even with the new partner, a consultant had to work to enhance their reports into a useful format,
otherwise the information would have been unusable and ignored. No comprehensive, electronic
system of record exists in which to pull historical logistics information. Most information is
captured on home-grown excel spreadsheets and rarely shared unless requested. In order to
understand the costs and cargoes onboard individual shipments for one of the larger logistics
programs, three years of cryptic paper invoices had to be translated into usable information.
By working with the PDS-L team, an initial list of logistics key measurements was compiled, as
shown in Figure 9. The metrics were focused on service performance, financial performance and
visibility or tracking. Service performance is important in understanding the efficiency of logistics
execution. Financial performance provides a more detailed view of expenses which could help drive
cost reduction opportunities. Visibility or tracking metrics include information on future workloads
that needs to be planned in advance due to long lead times, etc.
Initially, some of these metrics would be uncollectable, but they provide a goal and target for future
information technology enhancements.
Service Performance Transit Time N Better visibility tools
Service Performance On-time pickup and delivery N Need visibility tools
Service Performance Container utilization N
Service Performance Detention charges N Summarized list from carriers
Financial Performance Invoices & charges Y Need electronic format with more granularity
Financial Performance Mode of transport N Need in electronic format
Financial Performance Vendor diversification N Creation of scorecards
Financial Performance Conformance to rates Y Manual process to collect. Use freight auditor.
Tracking Balance against N Need electronic capture
import/export licenses
Tracking Workload planning N Visibility to upcoming shipments
Figure 9: PDS-L Targeted Metrics
3.5 Partner With Customer for Process Improvements
The PDS-L team spends an inordinate amount of time looking for transportation alternatives for
finished goods returning from international partners. PDS-L's process is non-standard, iterative in
nature and most times ended in the same result, no shipments booked. Explosive cargo logistical
challenges and USG constraints had become roadblocks to finding feasible alternatives. No regular
U.S.-Flag liner service exists in the ports of call for the countries from which PDS has to ship
finished goods. If U.S.-Flag liner service is available, the ocean cargo carrier either is unwillingly to
transport class 1 cargo or makes stops at ports banning class 1 cargo. Liner service is preferred by
PDS-L as it usually provides lower per container costs that align with PDS's budget forecasts. As air
freight is not economically viable, PDS regularly obtains quotes from U.S.-Flag charter ship
operators. As these ocean charter quotes are usually three to five times more expensive than non
U.S.-Flag service, PDS declares the quotes as unreasonable cost according to the Military Cargo Act
of 1904. PDS ultimately applies for waivers with the USG. Data was collected on the waiver
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Figure 10: U.S.-Flag Waiver Request Response Times
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Some interesting trends were beginning to form. Waivers previously granted within 10 days were
increasing in response time and some were denied for the Atlantic. Denials and increasing waiver
response time negatively impacted PDS's ability to meet negotiated delivery commitments. Missed
deliveries were subject to penalties from the USG, unexpectedly increasing budgeted program costs.
Phone conversations conducted with the USG's Program Contract Officers and MARAD to
develop economically viable shipping alternatives was unsuccessful. Ultimately the absoluteness of
these laws was cited by the USG.
A group from PDS traveled to meet with the USG contract officers to collaboratively develop a
value stream map that could identify opportunities within both PDS and USG's processes to help
facilitate a smoother process for shipping finished goods from international ports back to the
military depots following the U.S. laws. The meetings ultimately proved ineffective as PDS was
confined to economic concerns and the USG was confined to processes around the Military Cargo
Act of 1904. The experience generated from this meeting ultimately impacted the recommendation
described in Section 4.1.
3.6 Benchmark
"Information is the oxygen of the modern age."
Ronald Reagan
Encouraging the organization to reach out to business units in adjacent industries or sections of the
supply chain is critical to uncovering cost saving opportunities and partnerships. Many companies
stress benchmarking and best practice activities between divisions and business units. Armament
Solutions (AS), the parent company of PDS, did not mandate best practices sharing between
business units and consequently PDS had insulated itself from the rest of the company. Reaching
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out for help and learning from others is not a complex task, and within the company there was a lot
of knowledge and willingness to help with identifying possible improvement opportunities. During
this study, several partnership and cost saving opportunities were revealed through corporate
benchmarking and networking.
3.6.1 Internal Partners
One of AS's business divisions operates ocean shipping vessels for the U.S. military. An initial
conversation with executives at this division educated them on PDS's challenge, yet it provided no
immediately applicable solutions. Several months later, leaders from this same division approached
PDS with a partnership proposal that could significantly simplify the cost and operations of moving
explosive cargo and eliminate many of the constraints the PDS-L team faced. This is one example
of how reaching out to others is extremely critical in learning and discovering new cost saving
opportunities.
3.6.2 Corporate Transportation Committee
Though not mandated by Armament Solutions, many of the business divisions' logistics leaders met
quarterly to share best practices through a transportation committee meeting. This committee
voluntary came together to identify and measure corporate wide partners whereby pooling divisions'
transportation volumes could be used to obtain preferential pricing for different transportation
providers in multiple modes (LTL, small package, expedited, etc.). This pricing was available to all
business divisions, regardless of their participation in the committee. Each of the transportation
provider's representatives attended the meeting to share their latest performance metrics and recent
developments.
PDS-L personnel had not participated in these meetings in more than a year-and-a-half and
consequently missed on developing relationships and knowledge that could help improve their
business and workload. For instance, another business division had been using their own regularly
scheduled air charter flight to a country where PDS-L occasionally chartered expedited materials. By
not participating in these meetings PDS-L had missed the possibility of "piggybacking" on this
division's work and partnerships to realize possible cost savings.
Using and sharing the transportation committee's established pricelists could significantly reduce the
quote solicitation workload faced by the PDS-L team and result in better rates. For example,
research into a business agreement with a carrier with whom PDS had recently renewed a contract
revealed that by simply using the price lists put together by the committee would have saved 20% in
transportation costs over PDS's negotiated rates.
3.6.3 Active On-Demand®
Some of Armament Solutions' transportation committee leaders had begun experimenting with a
software solution called Active On-Demand® (AOD). The solution provided an auction
marketplace where shippers could post details on the cargo they needed shipped and transportation
providers would bid on their best pricing options. Air charter (domestic/international) and
domestic trucking were available options. The user could restrict the bidding to their preferred
carriers and in the case of PDS, this was important as the list could be confined to SDDC certified
carriers. Carrier's historical on-time performance and other quality metrics were measured and
visible through the software. Real time visibility was provided through GPS tracking. Shippers were
charged a per transaction fee and invoices were audited by the system. Data was archived for seven
years and a variety of reports was available.
AOD provided simple and immediate transportation information for a low cost. The participating
business divisions had raved about the simplicity and cost savings realized through the solution.
PDS-L could use the tool to establish a portal for all domestic shipments and gain real time visibility
to shipments. Shipment bookings could be input by others and the PDS-L team would be
responsible for selecting the best carrier option. Based on PDS's relatively28 low quantity of
domestic shipments, AOD was a cost effective way to realize the benefits of a transportation
management system. Again, none of this information or ideas would have been available if not for
participation and networking with others facing similar challenges as PDS.
3.7 Identify 3PL and Other Transportation Partners
The value stream maps constructed were transformed into a request for quote and sent to a variety
of 3PL's. As mentioned in section 3.3, outcomes of the value stream maps included a need for
information technology to drive metrics collection and tools for simplifying the quotation and
administrative paperwork processes. For PDS-L, the right 3PL partner had to provide ready
information technology solutions and onsite support to run operations.
In 2007, the 3PL industry had $122 billion in revenues29, spread among many firms. Figure 11
shows the four criteria established to find the most relevant 3PL partners.
28 Based on comparisons with other Armament Solutions business divisions
29 (Berman, 2008)
Figure 11: 3PL Decision Criteria
The 3PL industry has had a major focus on building its information technology capability making it
hard to differentiate between companies. Fewer companies had DoD experience and were
interested in staffing and supporting personnel at a shippers location. Even fewer were experienced
and versed in the regulations around global shipping of class 1 cargo, narrowing the list to
approximately four companies.
Multiple pricing models were offered that could achieve different goals for PDS. These fees only
addressed transportation management and not actual transportation charges:
* Fixed management fee - The 3PL would offer onsite services and transportation
management for a fixed fee per year. For instance, the 3PL would assess a yearly charge to
manage transportation management. PDS and the 3PL would need to assume volumes and
transactions at the start of the contract to properly size the transportation management team.
The benefit of this type pricing is that all costs are understood during the duration of the
contract, but one party may be leaving cost savings on the table.
* Cost-based management fee - The 3PL would offer onsite services for the cost of those
services, plus a profit margin fee. As an example, for every transaction that the 3PL
processes, a 5% management fee would be assessed. PDS would need to accurately forecast
transactions to budget for the cost of this solution. Based on their inefficient transportation
data collection resources, this could be difficult.
* Shared cost model - The 3PL and PDS would work together to identify opportunities to
share their cost burden and improve processes to reduce those expenses. This transparent
arrangement prevents the relationship from becoming one sided. The arrangement may
initially assume the cost-based model, but as the 3PL and PDS finds cost opportunities
through relationships and knowledge, the savings are shared.
All of these models could have a savings initiative added to them, where fees would have to improve
year over year based on targeted actions.
4 Conclusions
The PDS logistics organization should not be completely outsourced. It is important that PDS
maintain institutional knowledge within the organization, especially when the primary customer is
the U.S. Government. Flexibility in solutions and partners must be maintained as PDS operates
within a niche in the transportation industry; working with explosive cargo and U.S.-Flag vessel
restrictions. New transportation technologies and solutions exist at minimal cost and
implementation time that can quickly improve the PDS-L's execution across all programs.
It is imperative that PDS maintains its flexibility by retaining management and oversight of its
logistics organization and focus on three key recommendations (listed in order of importance):
1. Lobby the U.S. Government for help in high volume global DoD shipping
2. Build a culture of visible metrics
3. Create a hybrid logistics organization consisting of some outsourcing and new partners
It is estimated that adopting these solutions through a hybrid logistics organization would cost PDS
less than 1%/ of their 2007 transportation spend. Following through on these recommendations will
improve the financial performance, estimated in millions of dollars, and daily execution of the PDS
logistics organization. Logistics will also become a valuable contributor and differentiator, not an
afterthought in the execution of PDS programs.
4.1 Lobby U.S. Government
This section describes why PDS should utilize their corporate group to help educate the USG on
their constraints and challenges. Achieving results in this activity could improve the probability of
on-time finished goods deliveries to the USG, eliminate the stockpiling of explosive finished goods
at suppliers and reduce iterative quote solicitations by PDS.
PDS has been forced to solicit ocean charter operators in an attempt to ship product back from
international ports to the U.S. Most of these quotes were deemed unreasonable in cost, yet the USG
was unwillingly to grant cost waivers. Therefore, the product continued to sit at the international
supplier and PDS missed delivery commitments.
PDS engaged the USG, who in turn involved MARAD, in an attempt to drive a solution that could
enable PDS to deliver product on time, at reasonable cost, when no ocean liner service was available
from their Atlantic ports. These grass roots efforts, which included monthly waiver requests, phone
conversations with the USG and MARAD as well as a value stream mapping meeting with the USG
proved unsuccessful. It was apparent that strategic improvements could not be facilitated at this low
of a level.
PDS's corporate parent, Armament Solutions, located near Washington D.C., has not been engaged
to help with the transportation puzzle. The recommendation is that PDS engage lawmakers
regarding the feasibility of the Military Cargo Act of 1904 when high volume shipments of DoD
material are taking place internationally. The laws and infrastructure are not setup to support this
level of shipment frequency and cost.
Suggestions for improvement include:
1. Requiring U.S.-Flag service in all trade lanes
The USG currently subsidizes ocean shippers to maintain a fleet of U.S.-Flag vessels through
the MSP/VISA provision. Through this same legislation, they could also enforce the
availability of U.S.-Flag vessels in trade lanes, including the Mediterranean. Of utmost
importance is that these carriers stop in ports that allow hazardous cargo. It was noticed
that there was built-up demand by shippers in locations such as Israel for U.S.-Flag service,
yet none existed and ocean carriers planned no service.
2. Increased subsidy
As highlighted in Section 2.3, the USG derives tremendous flexibility and value through the
MSP/VISA program which provides subsidies to ocean carriers to maintain U.S.-Flag
vessels. These costs are hardly enough to offset the higher U.S.-Flag costs and the carriers
rely on their preferred status with the USG for additional volume. The conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan have provided much of the volume, but with rumors of President Obama
pulling out troops, there is reason for concern. The ocean carriers will need volume and
enforcement of the Military Cargo Act of 1904 to ensure that volume of cargo comes their
way.
This does not bode well for PDS in their hope that more U.S.-Flag liner service would
become available or that more waivers would be granted. Increasing the subsidy might
encourage more liner operators to provide U.S.-Flag carrier service. This in turn would open
up new lanes to U.S.-Flag liner service, which might help PDS. Without an increase in the
subsidy, there is no incentive for liner operators to provide additional service.
3. MARAD Facilitation
MARAD maintains relationships and is responsible for governing all trade activities with
U.S.-Flag vessels. Due diligence in researching all options by PDS was still not as efficient as
speaking with MARAD. Given a set of economic criteria, it would be time efficient to allow
MARAD to facilitate the transactions of hazardous cargo from international ports. Carriers
were incentivized to cooperate with MARAD to stay in their good graces.
4. Utilize USTRANSCOM Vessels
PDS is unique in that they are responsible for moving hazardous DoD cargo, yet don't have
the luxury of using the U.S. military logistics network. In the interest of economies of scale
and tax payer interests, it might be worthwhile to encourage USTRANSCOM to pick up
loads in international ports.
4.2 Build Culture of Visible Metrics
"We made a grave error when we eliminated visual controls such as wall schedules and replaced them with computers.a30
'"Wall charts... They involve the team and compel action. "3
'People looking at well-designed charts on a wall can have vey effective discussions' 2
As identified in sections 3.1 and 3.4, PDS does not have a culture of measuring logistics'
performance. This is reflected in their lack of initiative to develop long term infrastructure to collect
transportation data. PDS must build a culture of measuring itself to identify logistics improvement
opportunities and activities. Creating new metrics and measurements is not enough to drive a
culture of accountability. Moving to a culture of Visible Measurement will enable PDS to quickly
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Popular in factory environments, wall charts can be successful in the office environment. The
Visual Management Triangle33, illustrated in Figure 12, is a useful way to think about how PDS could









Figure 12: The Visual Management Triangle
Seeing as a group for PDS entails conducting at least weekly meetings around a posted metrics
board. Building an area where everyone, from the lowest level to the program leaders, has to
participate together helps facilitate conversation and understanding. The board is the facilitator of
team meetings and includes all actions and updates. Meetings should take place with everyone
standing around the board. This encourages timely and objective execution.
Knowing as a group includes posting goals and schedules to ensure that the team is aligned on the
true objectives of the team and organization. As PDS delivery schedules were dynamic, posting
them helps ensure alignment among entire teams.
Acting as a group ensures that team members are not acting on their own in their own self interest.
It also acts to measure accountability. The peer pressure of acting together will encourage team
33 (Dennis, 2007)
members to participate and keep up. If a team member is not following through, they will quickly
be exposed, prompting further action. Posting and talking about metrics are also not enough.
Actions must be listed and reviewed at each meeting.
In implementing visible metrics, many organizations become paralyzed by making sure that their
visual management board is perfect before it is posted and visible to the team. This is a certain case
for delay in overall improvement. Action drives evolution and posting metrics will encourage
certain actions from all parties. Each metric should list the owner, updated date and frequency for
updating. Data may not be perfect or right, but posting it will drive certain activity to evolve it and
make it right.
There was a perception among many in PDS that the PDS-L team was unable to follow through on
its commitments, specifically through late or missed shipments. Visibly posting PDS-L metrics and
actions will enable the PDS-L team to educate and involve all PDS programs on their statuses and
leave no room for conjecture. Program teams will be forced to participate and involve themselves in
the affairs of logistics and not place blame after the fact. PDS-L can be the example for the rest of
PDS in how to drive a culture of visible measurement and action.
4.3 Hybrid Logistics Organization
PDS has three different options for improving its logistics organization:
I I I




Revamping and building an in-house world class logistics organization is a difficult and time
consuming proposition. Building a logistics core competency requires PDS management support,
which was uncertain. PDS would have to drastically improve their logistics capabilities through
improved information technology. Transportation Management Systems (TMS) firms contacted
hinted that at a minimum these systems would cost half-a-million dollars and require at least one
year of implementation time. Additionally, the systems would have to be maintained by PDS,
adding to their yearly maintenance fees. Two of the solution providers contacted mentioned that
the overall PDS logistics spend was almost too small for investment in an enterprise level TMS. The
life of many PDS programs was less than three years and PDS investing in a significant amount of
fixed assets in logistics is risky.
Outsourcing all logistics activities was advocated by several PDS executives. They felt that PDS had
gotten in "over its head" with the logistics involved in recent programs. Their desire was to bring in
a 3PL or other partner to manage all logistics activities. Though not stated, PDS management really
wanted someone they could hold accountable for logistics performance and improvement. This is a
fallacy in how to approach a 3PL relationship. Successful 3PL outsourcing relationships are built on
working collaboratively. Working with the USG to facilitate shipment of class 1 cargo is a dynamic
process and PDS would still have to be engaged in logistics operational support. Retaining internal
expertise is also especially important. It is imperative that companies consider 3PLs if logistics is not
their core competency, but still maintain logistics management. By outsourcing logistics
management, some companies ultimately lost visibility into their supply chains and found it hard to
build back that capability.
'Don't let go of logistics management"34
The hybrid solution recommendation for evolving the logistics operation is predicated on the
philosophy that PDS maintains its flexibility by retaining leadership control of the logistics
organization. Especially in working a niche market involving explosive, DoD cargo built globally,
the organization must retain control and responsibility for all activities. As discussed though, there is
a significant opportunity to work more efficiently by employing partners and tools to drive the
administrative activities and achieving cost savings. The hybrid solution is implemented by injecting
new leadership into PDS-L, employing a 3PL partner onsite to drive operational activities and
standardizing all domestic transportation on Active On-Demand". Successful implementation and
execution will enable the PDS-L team to trim their administrative workload and possess partners
that can develop innovative and cost efficient solutions and avoid problems currently faced by the
team.
4.3.1 Leadership
New leadership is critical to improve performance and to facilitate efficient management of the
team. Figure 13 illustrates the competencies currently possessed and those needed to transform the
PDS-L team. The leader has to manage the internal dynamics and processes of the team as well as
manage external expectations. Though explosives and DoD shipping knowledge is useful, the leader
must be unafraid to challenge conventional wisdom, explore new processes and reach out to new
partners. The team has grown organically and needs outside perspective to inject new ideas into
daily operations.







4.3.2 Logistics Organization Workflow
The hybrid logistics organization operates through two workflows, illustrated in Figure 14. Complex
and international shipments are handled by onsite 3PL agents, managed by a PDS-L operations lead.
Domestic shipments and any air charters are facilitated through the Active On-Demand® (AOD)
tool or established contracts through the Armament Solutions transportation committee.
Figure 13: PDS-L Leadership Fulcrum
Pre-negotiated shipping Existing Door to Door
agreements Solution
Figure 14: Hybrid Solution Logistics Workflow
4.3.3 Onsite 3PL Support
A 3PL partner brings strong and established shipping industry wide relationships, providing faster
transportation solutions execution and avoiding the repetitive work faced by the PDS-L team. 3PLs
pool volumes from multiple shippers together to achieve pricing economies of scale. 3PLs bring
sophisticated information technology visibility and reporting tools. They bring standardized
processes and lean process tools and utilize their transportation knowledge to quickly identify and
achieve cost savings.
Onsite 3PL associates will own PDS-L's time consuming and repetitive administrative tasks. An
onsite presence will help drive accountability and ownership that PDS leadership desires. The new
organization structure, showing the role and employer, is shown in Figure 15:
- - -
Operations Clerk I I Broker Clerk I
I 3PL I 3PL
Figure 15: Hybrid Solution PDS-L Organizational Structure
The 3PL operations clerk performs all transportation booking, tracking, reporting and issue
resolution functions. The onsite customs broker completes, tracks and reports all customs
documentation and activities. Having an onsite customs broker gives PDS-L the flexibility to
consider more cost efficient transportation solutions rather than be forced to utilize less efficient
partners that provided complex customs brokerage services. In the event of 3PL onsite personnel
absences, 3PL personnel from an offsite command center would provide support.
The PDS operations lead will direct and provide support to the onsite 3PL personnel and retains all
PDS logistics knowledge. This person will maintain the face of logistics to the U.S. Government.
The lead will also interact with 3PL management in the event of any escalations or problems.
Freeing the operations lead from the daily administrative tasks will enable a focus on improving the
USG relationship as well as strategic and improvement initiatives.
4.3.4 Active On-Demand"
Active On-Demand" (AOD) offers a simple, web-based process for driving standardization across
all PDS programs for domestic trucking transportation. Implementation takes less than one week
and PDS-L's workload is reduced by requesting that all partners use the AOD portal to book
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shipments. The PDS team would then approve the quoted booking requests and select a carrier.
Visibility of shipments and auditing of payments occurs automatically through the software.
Other AS business divisions that had been piloting AOD were unclear on whether AOD truly
provided lower transportation costs vs. negotiated rates. They were sure of the benefits through
simplified transportation booking, tracking and administrative tasks. It is recommended that PDS-L
drive periodic audits of the AOD cost per shipment vs. corporate negotiated transportation rates to
evaluate perceived versus actual benefit.
4.3.5 Business Case and Implementation
It is estimated that utilizing 3PL fixed management fee pricing3" and AOD 36 would cost PDS less
than 10/037 of PDS's 2007 transportation spend. This does not assume any shipping savings provided
by both the 3PL and AOD. The hybrid logistics organization solution offers a faster time to
implement than organically expanding the PDS-L organization or fully outsourcing to a 3PL. The
longest lead time items will be selecting a 3PL partner, settling on a contract and integrating the 3PL
into PDS38.
PDS would quickly possess a flexible solution that upgrades their transportation industry network as
well as implements inexpensive information technology used to drive metrics. This creates an
organization that is able to actively track and meet delivery schedules, potentially saving millions of
dollars in possible penalties and costly transportation. As PDS's strategy and programs change, the
PDS-L team will now have historical data and metrics that can provide insights into setting the
35 Two 3PL salaries plus a margin markup
36 Total :2007 PDS programs' domestic shipments multiplied times AOD's per transaction charge
37 Calculated by dividing total 3PL and AOD costs by total 2007 PDS logistics costs
38 Follovwing the 3PL integration methodologies in section 2.5
correct logistics strategy at the time of enablement, not after the fact. Most importantly, PDS will
value the PDS-L team and its partners as an operational and financial contributor to the overall
success of PDS's programs.
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APPENDIX
Exhibit 1 - Explosives Classification Codes
Description of substances or article to be classified Compatibility Classification
group code
Primary explosive substance A 1.1A
Article containing a primary explosive substance and not containing two or more B 1.1B
effective protective features. Some articles, such as detonators for blasting, 1.2B
detonator assemblies for blasting and primers, cap-type, are included, even 1.4B
though they do not contain primary explosives.
Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating explosive substance or article C 1.1C
containing such explosive substance 1.2C
1.3C
1.4C
Secondary detonating explosive substance or black powder or article containing a D 1.1D
secondary detonating explosive substance, in each case without means of 1.2D
initiation and without a propelling charge, or article containing a primary 1.4D
explosive substance and containing two or more effective protective features 1.5D
Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, without means of E 1.1E
initiation, with a propelling charge (other than one containing flammable liquid or 1.2E
gel or hypergolic liquid) 1.4E
Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance with its means of F 1.1F
initiation, with a propelling charge (other than one containing flammable liquid or 1.2F
gel or hypergolic liquid) or without a propelling charge 1.3F
1.4F
Pyrotechnic substance or article containing a pyrotechnic substance, or article G 1.1G
containing both an explosive substance and an illuminating, incendiary, tear- 1.2G
producing or smoke-producing substance (other than a water-activated article or 1.3G
one containing white phosphorus, phosphide or flammable liquid or gel or 1.4G
hypergolic liquid)
Article containing both an explosive substance and white phosphorus H 1.2H
1.3H
Article containing both an explosive substance and flammable liquid or gel J 1.1J
1.2J
1.3j
Article containing both an explosive substance and a toxic chemical agent K 1.2K
1.3K
Explosive substance or article containing an explosive substance and presenting a L 1.1L
special risk (e.g., due to water-activation or presence of hybergolic liquids, 1.2L
phosphides or pyrophoric substances) needing isolation of each type 1.3L
Articles containing only extremely insensitive detonating substances. N 1.6N
Substance or article so packed or designed that any hazardous effects arising from S 1.4S
accidental functioning are limited to the extent that they do not significantly
hinder or prohibit fire fighting or other emergency response efforts in the
immediate vicinity of the package
Source: http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/ text-
idx?c= ecfr;rgn=div8;view=text;node=49%3A2.1.1.3.8.3.25.3;idno=49;cc=ecfr
Exhibit 2 - Segregation of Hazardous Materials
6.1 liquids
1.1 2.3 gas 2.3 gas PG 1 8 liquids
Class or division Notes 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.2 Zone A Zone B 3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 Zone A 7 only
Explosives 1.1 and 1.2 A * * * * * X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Explosives 1.3 *X X X X X X X X X X
Explosives 1.4 * * * * * O O O O O O O
Veryinsensitiveexplosives 1.5 A I i ' 
'  
0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Extremely insensitive explosives 1.6
Flammablegases 2.1 X X 0 X X 0 O O
Non-toxic, non-flammable gases 2.2 X X
Poisonous gas Zone A 2.3 X X 0 X X X X X X X X X
Poisonous gas Zone B 2.3 X X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flammable liquids 3 X X 0 X X 0 0 X
Flammablesolids 4.1 X X X 0 X 0
Spontaneously combustible materials 4.2 X X O X X O X X
Dangerous when wet materials 4.3 X X X X 0 X 0
Oxidizers 5.1 A X X X . .0 0 x 0
Organic peroxides 5.2 X X X X 0O X 0
Poisonous liquidsPG I zoneA . X X X 0 X X X X X X X
Radioactive materials 7 X X 0
Corrosive liquids 8 X X 0 X X O O X O O O X
Instructions for using the segregation table for hazardous materials are as follows:
(1) The absence of any hazard class or division or a blank space in the Table indicates that no restrictions apply.
(2) The letter "X" in the Table indicates that these materials may not be loaded, transported, or stored together in the same
the course of transportation.
transport vehicle or storage facility during
(3) The letter "O" in the Table indicates that these materials may not be loaded, transported, or stored together in the same transport vehicle or storage facility during
the course of transportation unless separated in a manner that, in the event of leakage from packages under conditions normally incident to transportation,
commingling of hazardous materials would not occur. Notwithstanding the methods of separation employed, Class 8 (corrosive) liquids may not be loaded above or
adjacent to Class 4 (flammable) or Class 5 (oxidizing) materials; except that shippers may load truckload shipments of such materials together when it is known that the
mixture of contents would not cause a fire or a dangerous evolution of heat or gas.
(4) The "*" in the Table indicates that segregation among different Class 1 (explosive) materials is governed by the compatibility table in paragraph (f) of this section.
(5) The note "A" in the second column of the Table means that, notwithstanding the requirements of the letter "X" , ammonium nitrate (UN 1942) and ammonium
nitrate fertilizer may be loaded or stored with Division 1.1 (explosive) or Division 1.5 materials.
(6) When the § 172.101 Table or § 172.402 of this subchapter requires a package to bear a subsidiary hazard label, segregation appropriate to the subsidiary hazard
must be applied when that segregation is more restrictive than that required by the primary hazard. However, hazardous materials of the same class may be stowed
together without regard to segregation required for any secondary hazard if the materials are not capable of reacting dangerously with each other and causing
combustion or dangerous evolution of heat, evolution of flammable, poisonous, or asphyxiant gases, or formation of corrosive or unstable materials.
Source: http://www.myregs.com/dotrspa/goto.asp?ref= CFR49.177.848
Exhibit 3 - Compatibility Table for Class 1 (Explosives) Materials
Compatibility I I I I I I I I
Group A B C D E F G H J K L N S
A X X X X X X X X X X X X
B X X X (4) X X X X X X X X 4/5
C X X 2 2 X 6 X X X X 3 4/5
D X X (4) 2 2 X 6 X X X X 3 4/5
E X X 2 2 X 6 X X X X 3 4/5
F X X X X X X X X X X X 4/5
G X X 6 6 6 X X X X X X 4/5
H X X X X X X X X X X X 4/5
J X X X X X X X X X X X 4/5
K X X X X X X X X X X X 4/5
L X X X X X X X X X X 1 X X
N X X 3 3 3 X X X X X X 4/5
S X 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 X 4/5
Instructions for using the compatibility table for Class 1 (explosive) materials are as follows:
(1) A blank space in the Table indicates that no restrictions apply.
(2) The letter "X" in the Table indicates that explosives of different compatibility groups may not be carried on the same transport vehicle.
(3) The numbers in the Table mean the following:
(i) "1" means an explosive from compatibility group L shall only be carried on the same transport vehicle with an identical explosive.
(ii) "2" means any combination of explosives from compatibility groups C, D, or E is assigned to compatibility group E.
(iii) "3" means any combination of explosives from compatibility groups C, D, or E with those in compatibility group N is assigned to compatibility group D.
(iv) "4" means 'see 5 17 7 .8 3 5 (g) 'when transporting detonators.
(v) "5" means Division 1.4S fireworks may not be loaded on the same transport vehicle with Division 1.1 or 1.2 (explosive) materials.
(vi) "6" means explosive articles in compatibility group G, other than fireworks and those requiring special handling, may be loaded, transported and stored with
other explosive articles of compatibility groups C, D and E, provided that explosive substances (such as those not contained in articles) are not carried in the same
vehicle.
Source: http://www.myregs.com/dotrspa/goto.asp?ref= CFR49.177.848
Exhibit 4 - Component Shipment Value Stream Map
PDS Process .
Exhibit 4 illustrates the process required for PDS-L to facilitate moving raw materials from their domestic U.S. suppliers to their
international finished goods suppliers. The zigzag arrows show the electronic information that PDS-L was responsible for transmitting and
receiving from Raw Material and Finished Goods suppliers as well as 3PL and Customs Broker partners. The main learning from this map
was the complexity and attention required to successfully facilitate each shipment. PDS-L needed help through tools and resources to
efficiently manage all of the transactions.
Exhibit 5 - Finished Goods Shipping Value Stream Map
Timeline
Exhibit 5 illustrates the process for PDS-L to facilitate transporting finished goods back to U.S. Military depots. The zigzag arrows show
the electronic information that PDS-L was responsible for transmitting and receiving to the USG, Finished Goods suppliers as well as 3PL
and Customs Broker partners. The main learning from this map was the complexity and work required to successfully facilitate each
shipment. PDS-L needed help through tools and resources to efficiently manage all of the transactions.

















Exhibit 6 describes the pre-defined processes in Exhibit 5. Ensuring that suppliers had containers
was critical, otherwise it could delay shipments. Making sure transportation providers were paid was
also critical in ensuring that shipments were not held in customs Cashier Clearance.
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